# 1AC- Zizek

## notes

## 1AC

### 1AC- Generic

#### Colleges and universities have significantly repressed constitutionally protected speech—as political correctness defines the milieu of campuses, limits on speech have all but disappeared with the rise of Trump

**Burleigh 16** [Nina Burleigh (Newsweek's National Politics Correspondent. She is an award-winning journalist and the author of five books. Her last book, The Fatal Gift of Beauty: The Trials of Amanda Knox, was a New York Times bestseller. In the last several years, she has covered a wide array of subjects, from American politics to the Arab Spring). “The Battle Against ‘Hate Speech’ on College Campuses Gives Rise to a Generation that Hates Speech.” Newsweek. May 26th, 2016. <http://www.newsweek.com/2016/06/03/college-campus-free-speech-thought-police-463536.html>]

More than half of America’s colleges and universities now have restrictive speech codes. And, according to a censorship watchdog group, 217 American colleges and universities—including some of the most prestigious—have speech codes that “unambiguously impinge upon free speech.” Judges have interpreted the First Amendment broadly, giving Americans some of the most expansive rights of speech in the world. But over the past two decades, and especially the past few years, American college administrators and many students have sought to confine speech to special zones and agitated for restrictions on language in classrooms as well. To protect undergrads from the discomfort of having to hear disagreeable ideas and opinions, administrators and students—and the U.S. Department of Education—have been reframing speech as “verbal conduct” that potentially violates the civil rights of minorities and women. American college campuses are starting to resemble George Orwell’s Oceania with its Thought Police, or East Germany under the Stasi. College newspapers have been muzzled and trashed, and students are disciplined or suspended for “hate speech,” while exponentially more are being shamed and silenced on social media by their peers. Professors quake at the possibility of accidentally offending any student and are rethinking syllabi and restricting class discussions to only the most anodyne topics. A Brandeis professor endured a secret administrative investigation for racial harassment after using the word wetback in class while explaining its use as a pejorative. As college campuses have become bastions of rigorously enforced political correctness, the limits on speech have come crashing down in the real world, with the presumptive Republican nominee for president dishing out macroaggressions on a daily basis. Donald Trump’s comments about the alleged criminality of Hispanics and Muslims, and about how fat or ugly his female enemies are, need no restating here, but many of his words would almost certainly be prohibited speech on most college campuses.

#### Trump is an example of how public vulgarity has returned to the political, disintegrating the ethical substance of public life—at the same time, restrictions which mandate politically correct speech contribute to the same destruction by normalizing state violence

**Zizek 16** [Slavoj Zizek (cultural critic). “The Return of Public Vulgarity.” Newsweek. February 12th, 2016. http://www.newsweek.com/return-public-vulgarity-425691]

We should be under no illusions about the meaning of statements like those of Netanyahu: They are a clear sign of the regression of our public sphere. Accusations and ideas that were till now confined to the obscure underworld of racist obscenity are now gaining a foothold in official discourse. The problem here is what Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel called Sittlichkeit: mores, the thick background of (unwritten) rules of social life, the thick and impenetrable ethical substance that tells us what we can and cannot do. These rules are disintegrating today: What was a couple of decades ago simply unsayable in a public debate can now be pronounced with impunity. It may appear that this disintegration is counteracted by the growth of political correctness, which prescribes exactly what cannot be said; however, a closer look immediately makes it clear how the "politically correct" regulation participates in the same process of the disintegration of the ethical substance. To prove this point, it suffices to recall the deadlock of political correctness: The need for PC rules arises when unwritten mores are no longer able to regulate effectively everyday interactions—instead of spontaneous customs followed in a nonreflexive way, we get explicit rules, such as when “torture” becomes an “enhanced interrogation technique.” The crucial point is that torture—brutal violence practiced by the state—was made publicly acceptable at the very moment when public language was rendered politically correct in order to protect victims from symbolic violence. These two phenomena are two sides of the same coin. We can discern a similar phenomenon in other domains of public life. When it was announced that, from July till September 2015, “Jade Helm 15”—a large U.S. military exercise—would take place in the Southwest, the news immediately gave rise to a suspicion that the exercises were part of a federal plot to place Texas under martial law in a direct violation of the Constitution. We find all the usual suspects participating in this conspiracy paranoia, up to Chuck Norris; the craziest among them is the website All News Pipeline, which linked these exercises to the closure of several Wal-Mart megastores in Texas: “Will these massive stores soon be used as 'food distribution centers' and to house the headquarters of invading troops from China, here to disarm Americans one by one as promised by Michelle Obama to the Chinese prior to Obama leaving the White House?” What makes the affair ominous is the ambiguous reaction of the leading Texas Republicans: Governor Greg Abbott ordered the State Guard to monitor the exercise, while Ted Cruz demanded details from the Pentagon. Trump is the purest expression of this tendency toward debasement of our public life. What does he do in order to “steal the show” at public debates and in interviews? He offers a mixture of “politically incorrect” vulgarities: racist stabs (against Mexican immigrants), suspicions on Obama’s birthplace and university diploma, bad-taste attacks on women and offenses to war heroes like John McCain. Such tasteless quips are meant to indicate that Trump doesn’t care about false manners and “says openly what he (and many ordinary people) think.” In short, he makes it clear that, in spite of his billions, he is an ordinary vulgar guy like all of us common people. However, these vulgarities should not deceive us: Whatever Trump is, he is not a dangerous outsider. If anything, his program is even relatively moderate (he acknowledges many Democratic achievements, and his stance toward gay marriage is ambiguous). The function of his “refreshing” provocations and vulgar outbursts is precisely to mask the ordinariness of his program. His true secret is that if, by a miracle, he wins, nothing will change—in contrast to Bernie Sanders, the leftist Democrat whose key advantage over the academic politically correct liberal left is that he understands and respects the problems and fears of ordinary workers and farmers. The really interesting electoral duel would have been the one between Trump as the Republican candidate and Sanders as the Democratic candidate. But why talk about politeness and public manners today when we are facing what appears to be much more pressing “real” problems? Because manners do matter—in tense situations, they are a matter of life and death, a thin line that separates barbarism from civilization. There is one surprising fact about the latest outbursts of public vulgarities that deserves to be noted. Back in the 1960s, occasional vulgarities were associated with the political left: Student revolutionaries often used common language to emphasize their contrast to official politics with its polished jargon. Today, vulgar language is an almost exclusive prerogative of the radical right, so that the left finds itself in a surprising position as the defender of decency and public manners. That’s why the moderate “rational” Republican right is in a panic: After the decline of the fortunes of Jeb Bush, it is desperately looking for a new face, toying even with the idea of mobilizing Bloomberg. But the true problem resides in the weakness of the moderate “rational” position itself. The fact that the majority cannot be convinced by the “rational” capitalist discourse and is much more prone to endorse a populist anti-elitist stance is not to be discounted as a case of lower-class primitivism: Populists correctly detect the irrationality of this rational approach; their rage directed at faceless institutions that regulate their lives in a nontransparent way is fully justified

#### This seeming paradox at the heart of speech restrictions proves the undecidability at the heart of our symbolic order—political correctness guarantees that offensiveness will appear in a worse form that is masked by benevolence--we must understand the power relations at the heart of language

Zizek 99 [Slavoj Zizek. The Ticklish Subject: The Absent Centre of Political Ontology. Pgs. 332-333, 1999. Google Books.]

In all these domains, the différend seems to be irreducible—that is to say, sooner or later we find ourselves in a grey zone whose mist cannot be dispelled by the application of some single universal rule. Here we encounter a kind of counterpoint to the ‘uncertainty principle’ of quantum physics; there is, for example, a structural difficulty in determining whether some comment was actually a case of sexual harassment or one of racist hate speech. Confronted with such a dubious statement, a ‘politically correct’ radical a priori tends to believe the complaining victim (if the victim experienced it as harassment, then harassment is was…), while a diehard orthodox liberal tends to believe the accused (if he sincerely did not mean it as harassment, then he should be acquitted…). The point, of course, is that this undecidability is structural and unavoidable, since it is the big Other (the symbolic network in which victim and offender are both embedded) which ultimately ‘decides’ on meaning, and the order of the big Other is, by definition, open; nobody can dominate and regulate its effects. That is the problem with replacing aggressive with ‘politically correct’ expressions: when one replaces ‘short-sighted’ with ‘visually challenged’, one can never be sure that this replacement itself will not generate new effects of patronizing and/or ironic offensiveness, all the more humiliating inasmuch as it is masked as benevolence. The mistake of this ‘politically correct’ strategy is that it underestimates the resistance of the language we actually speak to the conscious regulation of its effects, especially effects that involve power relations. So to resolve the deadlock, one convenes a committee to formulate, in an ultimately arbitrary way, the precise rules of conduct….It is the same with medicine and biogenetics (at what point does an acceptable and even desirable genetic experiment or intervention turn into unacceptable manipulation?), in the application of universal human rights (at what point does the protection of the victim’s rights turn into an imposition of Western values?), in sexual mores (what is the proper, non-patriarchal procedure of seduction?), not to mention the obvious case of cyberspace (what is the status of sexual harassment in a virtual community? How does one distinguish here between ‘mere words’ and ‘deeds’?) The work of these committees is caught in a symptomal vicious cycle: on the one hand, they try to legitimate their decisions by reference to the most advanced scientific knowledge (which, in the case of abortion, tells us that a foetus does not yet possess self-awareness and experience pain; which, in the case of a mortally ill person, defines the threshold beyond which euthanasia is the only meaningful solution); on the other hand, they have to evoke some non-scientific ethical criterion in order to direct and posit a limitation to inherent scientific drive.

#### Political correctness prevents us from truly overcoming inequalities—we choose to soften our language in lieu of challenging structures—only a method of shared obscene solidarity places ourselves and the Other on equal footing

**Merelli 15** [Annalisa Merelli (holds a master's degree in semiotics and a bachelor's degree in mass communication from the University of Bologna). “Slavoj Žižek thinks political correctness is exactly what perpetuates prejudice and racism.” Quartz. May 8th, 2015. http://qz.com/398723/slavoj-zizek-thinks-political-correctness-is-exactly-what-perpetuates-prejudice-and-racism/]

“I’m well aware that we should not just walk around and humiliate each other,” says the philosopher. And yet he finds that “there is something so fake about political correctness”—something that, according to him, prevents a true overcoming of prejudice and racism. Žižek explains: That’s my problem with political correctness. It’s just a form of self discipline which doesn’t really allow you too overcome racism. It’s just oppressed, controlled racism. Žižek’s words might be blunt, but his point is valid. Political correctness stems from the understanding that racism and inequality exist, and that in lieu of fixing those problems, prettier language will do the trick—as if by using inoffensive words and avoiding crass jokes we are to paint over the filth of reality. Politically correct expressions, to Žižek, become patronizing because they actually highlight inequalities. As the philosopher notes, “one needs to be very precise not to fight racism in a way which ultimately reproduces, if not racism itself, at least the conditions of racism.” The subtext of every carefully chosen, politically correct, expression is that there are still people in a position so privileged that they need to refer to “others” in a way that is not offensive—that doesn’t, for instance, make reference to their origin, or skin color. The implication is that there is nothing possibly offensive in the speaker’s skin tone or their origin. Jokes and blunt words can’t scratch their confidence—no, it’s only the rest of the population who needs the protection of politically correct language. Beyond the offensive jokes, avoiding politically correct language is also about calling things by their name. Just like a family friend’s three-year-old nephew who, back from his first day of kindergarten, excitedly told his parents: “I have a new friend! He’s all brown!” And it is not just race, of course, that Žižek talks about. Gender, disability–anything that diverges from norms presented in society or media–are all coated with neutral words and behaviors, by the very people who claim to be accepting of it. This special language, despite its intentions, serves to reinforce certain conditions as special, fragile, and weak. Can we dare to see differences for what they are—nothing else than differences? And can we ever safely name them, perhaps even with the occasional offensive joke? Perhaps adopting a little of Žižek’s attitude would indeed result in what he refers to as a “wonderful sense of shared obscene solidarity.” It might generate misunderstanding, but if a more light-hearted approach is adopted in a genuine way, that would reflect a profound belief that the other isn’t weaker, doesn’t need anyone’s protection, and is at our level—hence can openly be made fun of, just as we do of ourselves.

#### Vote aff to affirm the obscene—Only the 1AC fosters intellectual freedom—language must be a conduit for venting our aggressiveness—censorship forces us to repress our desires, making physical violence inevitable

**Schwartz 86** [Joel Schwartz (University of Toronto). “Freud and Freedom of Speech.” The American Political Science Review, Vol. 80, No. 4 (Dec., 1986), pp. 1227-1248. JSTOR.]

These statements suggest that Freud defends intellectual freedom for reasons similar to some of those motivating earlier figures such as John Stuart Mill. Freud, like Mill, appears to advocate freedom of speech and thought in order to facilitate the intellectual progress of the individual and the human race-in order to foster personal growth or development toward "the psychological ideal, the primacy of intelligence." Nevertheless, one senses a significant difference in tone between Freud and Mill: underlying Freud's praise of honest speech is an apparent hostility or aggressiveness directed against conven- tional "society," the "fainthearted" home of shamefacedlyy]" hypocritical or dishonest speech. Freud evidently prides himself on his honesty, which leads him both to express his anger at society and consequently to anger society. For Freud, intellectual freedom in some way appears to connote not only the search for truth but also the willingness to give vent to one's own aggressiveness and to brave the aggressiveness of others. I believe this is significant, for we will see that aggres- sion, both as manifested by Freud and as understood by him, is central to what is original and psychoanalytic in the Freud- ian defense of freedom of speech and emo- tion (which differs in important ways from the traditional and intellectual "Millian" defense of freedom of speech and thought). In order to understand Freud's specifically psychoanalytic grounds for defending freedom of speech, it is useful to begin with two statements in which he and his one-time collaborator Breuer ex- plain the reason for the importance of speech in psychoanalytic therapy. In the first, they write that "language serves as a substitute [Surrogat] for action; by its help, an affect can be 'abreacted' [i.e., a disturbing emotion can be discharged] almost as effectively [as it can by an action]" (Freud and Breuer, 1893a, p. 8). Developing this point in the second state- ment, Breuer adds that "telling things is a relief" (Freud and Breuer, 1895d, chap. 3, sec. 3, p. 211). However, these statements are primar- ily of interest not because of what they tell us about the function of speech within psychoanalytic therapy but because Freud's view of the social function of ordi- nary speech in some ways resembles his view of the function of the speech directed by a patient to his or her analyst. In society, as in therapy, Freud believes that "language serves as a substitute for action"-that "telling things is a relief." These beliefs lead Freud to construct his psychoanalytic argument suggesting both the advantages and, secondarily, the lim- itations of freedom of speech. Freud has been described as "the great liberator . . . of speech" (Marcus, 1975, p. 294); by assessing Freud's psychoanalytic argu- ment in comparison with more traditional arguments, my intention is to elucidate this description of Freud and to evaluate its adequacy. I do so hoping to increase not only our understanding of Freud but also our understanding of hte more tradi- tional liberal defense of freedom of speech. Cursing and Censorship Freud himself suggests the analogy that I have proposed between the function of speech in therapeutic situations specifi- cally and in social situations generally:3 The most adequate reaction [by which height- ened emotion can be lessened] is always a deed. But, as an English writer has wittily remarked, the man who first flung a word of abuse at an enemy instead of a spear was the founder of civilization. Thus the word is the substitute [Ersatz] for the deed, and in some circumstances (e.g., in Confession) the only substitute. Accord- ingly, alongside the adequate reaction there is one that is less adequate. (Freud, 1893h, p. 36; I have made the translation more literal.) What is crucially important about this statement is Freud's assumption that the first word (or at least the first relevant word in the civilizing process) was a word "of abuse." In saying this, Freud here im- plies something he states explicitly elsewhere: that social relations are inherently conflictual.4 One crucial function of speech is, therefore, to provide an outlet for our aggressiveness that is safer, both for us and for others, than physical violence. In an important sense (for which Freud elsewhere provides a theoretical justification) conflict is prior to and more fundamental than cooperation.5 Because this is already implicit in Freud's state- ment about the "word of abuse," one can say that Freud's understanding of lan- guage in some measure resembles Caliban's in Shakespeare's Tempest, for Caliban remarks to Prospero, "You taught me language, and my profit on't / Is, I know how to curse" (act 1, scene 2, lines 363-64). Language makes it possible for us to curse and profits us by enabling us to work out our hostility to others in a reasonably harmless manner. However, it is to some extent unfortunate, in Freud's view, that we are often unwilling to employ the linguistic vehicle for the exor- cism of our aggression because we are unwilling to admit our aggressiveness (and more generally, our egoism) to ourselves. Thus, the aggressiveness displayed by Freud vis-a-vis society and those whom he derisively calls "the masses stems in part from his impa- tience at their failure to acknowledge and to act out their aggressiveness.6 Insofar as we are reluctant to acknowledge our aggressiveness, Freud contends that we curtail the freedom of our own speech excessively and harm ourselves by repressing our aggressiveness instead of expressing it in our speech. Free speech should profit us Calibans by enabling us to curse. It does not always do so, however; we suppress our desire to curse because to a great extent-too great-we are Calibans with a bad conscience. Our bad conscience is apparent in a phenomenon whose very name suggests its relevance to the question of freedom of speech-the phenomenon Freud calls censorship. Freud employs the concept of censorship most prominently in his discussions of dreaming: censorship ac- counts for the fact that dreams must be interpreted for the fact that a dream is less "the fulfilment of a wish" than it is "a (disguised) fulfilment of a (suppressed or repressed) wish" (Freud, 1900a, ch. 2, p. 121, and chap. 4, p. 160, respectively). To explain why dreams are censored would take me well beyond the scope of my argument; for my purposes here, it is sufficient to note what is censored in dreams. Dream censorship is directed against things that are invariably of a reprehensible nature, repulsive from the ethical, aesthetic and social point of view-matters of which one does not venture to think at all or thinks only with dis- gust. These wishes, which are censored and given a distorted expression in dreams, are first and foremost manifestations of an unbridled and ruthless egoism. (Freud, 1916-17, lecture 9, p. 142)

#### I affirm that public colleges and universities in the United States ought not restrict any constitutionally protected speech.

#### Violence is not always given rational articulation—that makes it impossible to comprehend simply through moral philosophy—only psychoanalysis enables us to understand the symbolic violence at the heart of political correctness

Valentic 16

Tonci Valentic (University of Zagreb). “Symbolic Violence and Global Capitalism.” International Journal of Zizek Studies, vol. 2, no. 2. 2016. http://www.zizekstudies.org/index.php/IJZS/article/viewFile/108/108

The major task of philosophical analysis of violence in contemporary world should be developing a theory of political violence. Obviously, there are numerous theories on the respective issue, but very few of them reflect properly today's global socio-political constellation. For example, authors like Weber or Arendt provided noteworthy insight, but they cannot fully cope with issues we are dealing today in the beginning of 21st century. The main problem with violence is that it doesn't have always a deep-lying cause based on rational articulation, which means it is impossible to understand it only using arguments of classical political theory or moral philosophy: one had to incorporate psychoanalysis and semiotic or symbolic interpretation as well. Wherein should we search for relationship between violence and politics in today's world? Since violence is a complex phenomenon, several things have to be taken into account: first of all, it is always primarily a "structural" problem, an "objective" feature of today's capitalist societies. Second, as I mentioned before, structural (or objective) violence is placed in the very heart of capitalism itself (this is the idea that Slavoj Žižek advocates - relying on the idea which came from Balibar and is even earlier extracted out of Marxism). Third, violence does not necessarily refer to activity or any deeds: passivity can also be violent. The major point here is, as Žižek would put it, that violence presented in media (such as suicidal bombings, humanitarian crisis, terrorist attack, and so on) actually blinds us to the objective violence in the world where we become "perpetrators and not just innocent victims". As Žižek would argue, we consistently overlook the objective or "symbolic" violence embodied in language and its forms, i.e. democratic state's monopoly on legitimate violence. He asserts that "subjective and objective violence cannot be perceived from the same standpoint: subjective violence is experienced as such against the background of the non-violent zero-level, as a perturbation of the “normal” peaceful state of things; however, objective violence is precisely the violence sustaining this “normal” state of things. Objective violence is invisible since it sustains the very zero-level standard against which we perceive something as [visible] violence – in order to perceive it, one has to perform a kind of parallax shift". The horror of violent acts and empathy for the victims inexorably function as a lure which prevents us from thinking, for example when we are forced to act urgently, or when confronted with "humanitarian politics" of human rights that serves as the ideology of military interventionism for specific economic-political purposes, which utterly prevents any radical socio-political transformation (i.e. charity becomes the humanitarian mask hiding the face of economic exploitation). Having that in mind, there are four possible theoretical tasks one should undertake in order to clearly articulate a theory of political violence: 1) to point out that "structural" violence is in the heart of global capitalism, 2) to deconstruct media's coverage of crime, terrorism as well as humanitarian crisis, 3) to unravel true motives of terrorists, 4) to expose racism and racial violence as fear which is deeply rooted in the liberal and tolerant multicultural societies obsessed with political correctness. Therefore, as Žižek has pointed out, subjective violence we see (the one with a clear identifiable agent) is only the tip of an iceberg made up of "systemic" violence.

#### The role of the ballot and judge is to investigate violence through psychoanalytic phenomenology—this is uniquely key to understanding political correctness and fostering meaningful dialogue

Schwartz 16

Howard Schwartz. Political Correctness and the Destruction of Social Order: Chronicling the Rise of the Pristine Self. Palgrave Macmillan, pg. 4, 2016. Google Books.

The occasion for this has been what I call the rise, or the establishment, or the normalization, of the pristine self. This is a self that is touched by nothing but love. The problem is that nobody is touched by nothing but love, and so if a person has this as an expectation, if they have built their sense of themselves around this premise, the inevitable appearance of something other than love, indeed the appearance even of any other human being, blows this structure apart. That is where we are today. Where the idea of the pristine self has come from, how it and its decomposition have become manifest, and what the effects of this are likely to be, are the subjects of this book. I cannot offer a happy prognosis here, except to say that nothing lasts forever. This, too, shall pass and when it does those who are left will need to know how what happened to them happened. So I am writing a chronicle now. Hopefully, when the time comes, it will be of use. This is a work of what I call psychoanalytic phenomenology. My subject matter is my own mind. I try to understand the minds of others by finding them within my own. As I have said, my theoretical framework for this is psychoanalytic, and that calls for a word of explanation. The credibility of psychoanalytic theory is, of course, not universally granted. It has, however, a unique suitability to the study of political correctness. There is clearly an element of irrationality in political correctness. It is a form of censorship without a censor; we impose it on ourselves. Yet, it keeps us away from the reasoned discussion of social issues which everybody can see are important, consequential, and desperately in need of wide-ranging analysis. It does so through an emotional power that is rarely gainsaid and which anyone can see is ultimately against everyone’s interest; yet it prevails nonetheless. If that is not irrationality playing itself out in the social domain, what is? Yet where does it get that power? This is a question that is rarely posed—it is, after all, politically incorrect to do so—but it is no less important than the totality of the issues that political correctness has obscured. And if we do not approach this question through psychoanalytic theory, what, exactly, shall we approach it through? The rational understanding of irrationality is what psychoanalysis was developed to accomplish. In fact, more than any specific theory that is what psychoanalysis is. It is in that spirit that we will undertake this inquiry.

#### Self-reflexive interrogation of the psyche is essential to ushering in new patterns of symbolization

Moon 13

Davis S. Moon. “Autonomy and alienated subjectivity: A re-reading of Castoriadis, through Zizek.” Subjectivity, 6 (4). pp. 424-244. 2013. <http://opus.bath.ac.uk/36738/1/AaAS_Subjectivities_R_R_FINAL_DSM.pdf>

Alienation and Autonomy: Prerequisite, not Obstacle The key issue here is the psyche. For Castoriadis autonomy is predicated upon an ability to think ‘at a distance’ from the social-historical and this is made possible by the extrasocial matrix of meaning which exists in the monadic psyche, continuing across from the pre-socialised monadic state of the infans. On the other hand, autonomy in the Žižek-ian sense is made possible for exactly the opposite reason: It is the lack of any such monadic psyche which keeps open the possibility of traversing present sedimented modes of thinking. This is because the psyche, as lack, acts as ‘a hitch’ – that is, as ‘an impediment which gives rise to ever-new symbolizations by means of which one endeavours to integrate and domesticate it ... but which simultaneously condemns these endeavours to ultimate failure’ (Žižek, 1994b, 22). Indeed, to borrow a phrase from Deleuze and Guattari (1983, 8), the autonomous individual, it might be said, works (i.e. acts in a manner which can be deemed autonomous) ‘only when they break down, and by continually breaking down’. This is meant not in the Deleuzian sense – i.e. of a shattering, fragmenting or disintegrating subject – but instead as something akin to an irreparable perpetual-motion machine which, continual glitching and occasionally crashing, always subsequently re-boots with a modified programming: There is a ‘ghost’ in this machine, but this ghost is not the ‘mind’ as distinct from the ‘matter’ as understood in the normal Cartesian sense, but the catalytic tension created by the ineliminable ‘gap’ constitutive of subjectivity, be it 25 labelled ‘magma’ (following Castoriadis) or ‘lack’ (following Žižek). It is here that we find the space for a form of agential autonomy worthy of the name. As Fabio Vighi (2010, 133) writes in his own re-working of Žižek’s philosophy: ‘Žižek’s materialism is based on the groundbreaking insight that the gap constitutive of reality is nothing but the gap constitutive of subjectivity: we are the very impossibility that we ascribe to external reality, and that we must constantly disavow or displace if we are to connect with it.’ It is for this reason that ‘[i]t is therefore crucial, politically, to conceive self-alienation not as a problem but as the key to the solution’ (ibid, 101). In seeking answers regarding the possibility of autonomy, the focus must therefore be upon the occurrence of this ‘short-circuiting’ (Johnston, 2007, xxiii) qua displacement from external reality, how it comes about and the possibilities for pro-active, positive agency attached to it. Since Žižek’s position is that this short-circuiting occurs by surprise, without agential intension (2000, 376), the notion of seeking out encounters with such a resultant effect might seem too self-authorial and thus quasi-existentialist from his perspective. Yet arguably active critical reflexivity allows exactly such an act(ion), even with the excision of the positively-charged psychic monad. It is this ability which, as noted, for Castoriadis underlies subjects’ capacity for autonomy – his ‘project of autonomy’ envisaging ‘the maximization of the possibilities of reflection, self-reflection and deliberation’ (Peter Osborne quoted in Castoriadis, 1996, 13). As Sharpe and Bouchner note, in his early works Žižek (1989-c.1995) arguably shared such a view: ‘the political ideal that animates [this] work is the modern notion of autonomy: rational self-determination by self-legislating individuals, in opposition to our dependent, heteronomous subjection to the socio-political Other’ (2010, 63). This, however, was in his ‘radical democratic’ 26 phase, before and the embracing of the ‘Leninist-Lacanian’ Act as the only true path to change. In judging how this can be actualised we can return to Castoriadis, or at least one of his primary interpreters, David Ames Curtis and his delineation of the concept of improvisation. As Curtis (1988, xvii) describes, ‘[t]o “im-pro-vise” literally means not to “foresee,” not to anticipate’ (ibid, xvii). As a statement regarding action, this chimes in regards to the Act, as explained above. Discussing the concept via the metaphor of jazz improvisation, however, Curtis writes that: In “improvisation” as I conceive it, one does not act in an “immediate,” un-prepared way lacking all foresight ... The very process of “improvisation” ... involves planning, the making of choices (one of the most elementary being when to start “playing” and when to remain silent), and the creation of alternative forms of articulation (what to “play”); it also gives birth to that which was not contained in previous activities. (ibid, xix) Castoriadis (2010, 188) speaks of the need for an individual seeking ‘enlightenment’ to first ‘shake herself enough to be able to be enlightened’, the latter not being a passive state, but one sought: ‘You must want to be enlightened’ as ‘[t]he reception of the Enlightenment is just as creative as its creation.’ Like a reader who selects a random article from Subjectivity on the judgement that its content may confront her with radical new ideas which are until the point of encounter unanticipated, individuals can elect to self-reflexively interrogate their own positions on different issues of their own determining in a manner whereby the end point reached is unknown. What do I believe? Why do I believe it? Upon what grounds have I made this judgement? All knowledge of the world being mediated through existing socialhistorical imaginary-symbolic institutions, themselves held ‘open’ by the limits of the 27 Real, all judgements regarding these questions are made based upon contingently founded foundations and as such can become ‘unstuck' (see: Marchart, 2007). It is in looking at seemingly foundational statements awry that this lack of objective finality is evident. In all of this, self-reflexivity is key; however, pace Castoriadis, in said reflecting there is no pre-historic matrix of meaning to buttress and mould new ideas from. Rather, it is the alienation fundamental to subjectivity, barring the closure of individual identity, that makes possible subjective short-circuiting and thus keeps open spaces ‘at a distance’ from pre-existing systems of social significations wherein new patterns of symbolisation can arise. Peeling away justifications one arrives at the empty space of a pure “because”, thus dislocating the pre-existing imaginary-symbolic institution and opening up the space for another more ’readable’ (re)articulation. Castoriadis (2011, 38) himself compared this process to the autonomy of the poet, explaining that ‘[w]hen you write a poem, you use the words of the language, but what you are doing is not a combination of these words. It’s a new form that you impose on them, through their linkage, through a sense [esprit] that pervades a poem.’ This form of creation, he argues, ‘is not a simple reprisal of elements that were in existence’ as ‘[t]here is a new form [created] that is not limited to combination.’ As Kioupkiolis (2012, 188) echoes: ‘Original self-creation consists mainly in the sporadic emergence of new forms that cannot be fully reduced to antecedent conditions. But new figures make use of pre-existing materials and spring up within pre-established contexts.’ Such a conception of autonomous change viz. reflexive improvisation involves the rearticulation of pre-existing elements of the social-historical, such that a fundamentally new form of imaginary-symbolic representation is created ex nihlo. It thus offers a proactive conceptualisation of how radical agent-led change can occur which goes beyond, without rejecting, the Žižek-ian Act as (a) mode of autonomous revolution – but is not reliant upon Castoriadis’s problematic ontology of subjectivity based around concepts such as a monadic psyche containing a pre-social meaning which continues to exist post-socialisation. In an act of filtration, re-reading Castoriadis through Žižek as advocated here produces a new composite purer for being tainted.

# 1AR- Case

## XT

### XT: Case

#### Colleges and universities have repressed constitutionally protected speech- American college campuses are becoming Orwell's Thought police and restrictions on speech have arised Trump because he taps into the racist fevors of individuals- That's Burleigh

#### Trump's method of ethical obscenity has disintegrated public life- he abandoned political correctness- pc rules contribute to normalizing state violence because they are arbitrary and can deny revolutions the ability to change them because what the institution says is automatically true- That's Zizek

#### The paradox at the heart of restrictions requires a rejection of them- oppressive mindsets are hidden through restrictions and the only way to overcome power relations is to open them up to criticism- That's Zizek

#### Politiacl correctness is just oppressed controlled racism- pc prevents overcoming inequalities and we soften our languge instead of challenging structures

#### The 1AC's analysis of free speech is an injection of psychoanalysis into the debate space- prefer our method:

#### 1. It forster intellectual freedom that can change physcial violence which censorship makes inevitable- that's Schwartz

#### 2. It's the only way to reveal objective violence because morality and rationality can't tap into the fears and origins of ideas that pepole have- we must rupture and understand their psyche

#### 3. The role of the balllot is to investigate violence through psychoanlaytic phenomenotlogy- self reflexive interrogation of the psyche can usher new patterns of symbolizaiotn

### Weighing: Framework Clarification

#### Only offense that can undercover the true psyche of the world must be a starting point for understanding oppression- it’s a prerequisite to finding adequate policies- offense that is consequentialist doesn’t turn our aff- it’s a question of principles

# 1AR- DA

## AT: DA- Hate Speech

### 1AR- Hate Speech DA- Turns

#### Speech codes are more likely to work against minorities- Great Britain and Michigan prove

Strossen 90 [(Nadine, June 1990, president of the American Civil Liberties Union from February 1991 to October 2008, John Marshall Harlan II Professor of Law at New York Law School., “Regulating Racist Speech on Campus: A Modest Proposal?”, Duke Law Journal, Vol. 1990, No. 3, Frontiers of Legal Thought II. The New First Amendment (Jun., 1990), pp. 484-573, Duke University School of Law, http://www.jstor.org/stable/1372555]

First, there is no persuasive psychological evidence that punishment for name- calling changes deeply held attitudes. To the contrary, psycho-logical studies show that censored speech becomes more appealing and persuasive to many listeners merely by virtue of the censorship. Nor is there any empirical evidence, from the countries that do out-law racist speech, that censorship is an effective means to counter racism. For example, Great Britain began to prohibit racist defamation in 1965. 359 A quarter century later, this law has had no discernible adverse impact on the National Front and other neo- Nazi groups active in Brit- ain.360 As discussed above, 361 it is impossible to draw narrow regulations that precisely specify the particular words and contexts that should lead to sanctions. Fact- bound determinations are required. For this reason, authorities have great discretion in determining precisely which speakers and which words to punish. Consequently, even vicious racist epithets have gone unpunished under the British law.362 Moreover, even if actual or threatened enforcement of the law has deterred some overt racist in-sults, that enforcement has had no effect on more subtly, but nevertheless clear, signals of racism.363 Some observers believe that racism is even more pervasive in Britain that in the United States.364¶ C. Banning Racist Speech Could Aggravate Racism. For several reasons banning the symptom of racist speech may compound the underlying problem of racism. Professor Lawrence sets up a false dichotomy when he urges us to balance equality goals against free speech goals. Just as he observes that free speech concerns should be weighed on the pro- regulation, as well as the anti- regulation, side of the balance,365 he should recognize that equality concerns weigh on the anti-regulation, as well as the pro-regulation, side.366¶ The first reason that laws censoring racist speech may undermine the goal of combating racism flows from the discretion such laws inevitably vest in prosecutors, judges, and other individuals who implement them. One ironic, even tragic, result of this discretion is that members of minority groups themselves- the very people whom the law is intended to protect- are likely targets of punishment. For example, among the first individuals prosecuted under the British Race Relations Act of 1965 367 were black power leaders.368 Their overtly racist messages un-doubtedly expressed legitimate anger at real discrimination, yet the stat-ute drew no such fine lines, nor could any similar statute possibly do so. Rather than curbing speech offensive to minorities, this British law in-stead has been regularly used to curb the speech of blacks, trade union-ists, and anti- nuclear activists.369 In perhaps the ultimate irony, this statute, which was intended to restrain the neo-Nazi National Front, instead has barred expression by the Anti- Nazi League.370 ¶ The British experience is not unique. History teaches us that anti- hate speech laws regularly have been used to oppress racial and other minorities. For example, none of the anti- Semites who were responsible for arousing France against Captain Alfred Dreyfus were ever prose-cuted for group libel. But Emile Zola was prosecuted for libeling the French clergy and military in his “J’Accuse,” and he had to flee to Eng-land to escape punishment.371 Additionally, closer to home, the very doctrines that professor Lawrence invokes to justify regulating campus hate speech- for example, the fighting words doctrine, upon which he chiefly relies- are particularly threatening to the speech of racial and political minorities. ¶ The general lesson that rules banning hate speech will be used to punish minority group members has proven true in the specific context of campus hate speech regulations. In 1974, in a move aimed at the Na-tional Front, the British National Union of Students (NUS) adopted a resolution that representatives of “openly racist and fascist organiza-tions” were to be prevented from speaking on college campuses “by whatever means necessary (including disruption of the meeting).”373 A substantial motivation for the rule had been to stem an increase in cam-pus anti-Semitism. Ironically, however, following the United Nations’ cue,374 some British students deemed Zionism a form of racism beyond the bounds of permitted discussion. Accordingly, in 1975 British stu-dents invoked the NUS resolution to disrupt speeches by Israelis and Zionists, including the Israeli ambassador to England. The intended tar-get of the NUS resolution, the National Front, applauded this result. However, the NUS itself became disenchanted by this and other unin-tended consequences of its resolution and repealed it in 1977.375 ¶ The British experience under its campus anti- hate speech rule paral-lels the experience in the United States under the one such rule that has led to a judicial decision. During the approximately one year that the University of Michigan rule was in effect, there were more than twenty cases of whites charging blacks with racist speech. 376 More importantly, the only two instances in which the rule was invoked to sanction racist speech (as opposed to sexist and other forms of hate speech) involved the punishment of speech by or on behalf of black students.377 Additionally, the only student who was subjected to a full- fledged disciplinary hearing under the Michigan rule was a black student accused of homophobic and sexist expression.378 In seeking clemency from the sanctions imposed fol-lowing this hearing, the student asserted he had been singled out because of his race and his political views.379 Others who were punished for hate speech under the Michigan rule included several Jewish students accused of engaging in anti- Semitic expression380 and an Asian- American student accused of making an anti- black comment.381 Likewise, the student who recently brought a lawsuit challenging the University of Connecticut’s hate speech policy, under which she had been penalized for an allegedly homophobic remark, was Asian- American.382 She claimed that, among the other students who had engaged in similar expression, she had been singled out for punishment because of her ethnic background.383 ¶ Professor Lawrence himself recognizes that rules regulating racist speech might backfire and be invoked disproportionately against blacks and other traditionally oppressed groups. Indeed, he charges that other university rules already are used to silence anti- racist, but not racist, speakers.384 Professor Lawrence proposes to avoid this danger by ex-cluding from the rule’s protection “persons who were vilified on the basis of their membership in dominant majority groups.”385 Even putting aside the fatal first amendment flaws in such a radical departure from content- and viewpoint- neutrality principles, 386 the proposed exception would create far more problems of equality and enforceability than it would solve.387 ¶

#### Speech codes chill speech other than hate speech since people don’t want to risk violating the policy- that kills real movements

**Lukianoff 08**

<https://www.nas.org/articles/Campus_Speech_Codes_Absurd_Tenacious_and_Everywhere> Campus Speech Codes: Absurd, Tenacious, and Everywhere May 23, 2008 | Greg Lukianoff

Third, even if the university has not enforced the code, it is still part of its regulations and may, at any time, be pulled out when a student or faculty member might wish to silence, intimidate, or punish a member of the community whose opinions he or she disagrees with. It would most likely be at the very instances when free speech protections are most badly needed that the dormant code would be dusted off and put to work.37 Finally, and most importantly, the speech code itself, whether enforced or not, is the harm.  First Amendment jurisprudence recognizes this concept in the doctrine of “facial” unconstitutionality.  A speech regulation may be declared “facially” unconstitutional if it, by its very terms, sweeps in a large amount of clearly protected speech or if it is so vague that people of reasonable intelligence would have to guess at its meaning.  Either way, speech is “chilled” because the overwhelming majority of people typically would rather keep their mouths shut than risk the consequences of violating such a policy.  Furthermore, if the speech code is promulgated through the student handbook at a public university and the administration tells students that the university reserves the right to punish any speech that it deems “offensive,” it has both chilled speech and gravely misinformed students about their rights as students and citizens, whether the administration intends to enforce the speech code or not.

#### Censorship empirically makes hate speech more appealing because extremists get looked at as martyrs and revolutionaries,

**Heinze 16** (Eric Heinze – Professor of Law and Humanities at the University of London, “Hate Speech and Democratic Citizenship”, “The Prohibitionist Challenge”, pgs. 149-152, https://books.google.com/books?id=UJJyCwAAQBAJ&pg=PA150&lpg=PA150&dq=censoring+hate+speech+helps+the+right-wing+martyr&source=bl&ots=aVdz0PZtic&sig=prvOZgxAtkhebwxC7EDhcb6HDic&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwj0xaWXofLQAhXEwlQKHcqWDwUQ6AEIIjAB#v=onepage&q=censoring%20hate%20speech%20helps%20the%20right-wing%20martyr&f=false,

American oppositionists have lacked domestic empirical evidence of ineffectiveness, available on the continent, due to the post-1960s erosion and disappearance of American bans. They have nonetheless long warned against censorship’s tendency to tutor speakers in re-packaging and re-coding hateful messages, transforming crude insults into what Nadine Strossen calls ‘veiled innuendos’. The Harvard African-American Studies scholar Henry Louis Gates, Jr. challenges those who ‘spend more time worrying about speech codes than coded speech’. Historically, he notes, African Americans have not fared better in environments of polite speech. They have often still faced discrimination, yet without the blunt speech that would help them to make sense of it, and to plan their life strategies accordingly. ‘[the real power commanded by the racist’, Gates recalls, ‘is likely to vary inversely with the vulgarity with which it is expressed.’ Barack Obama makes a similar point in response to ongoing problems of US racism: ‘it’s not just a matter of it not being polite to say nigger in public. That’s not the measure of whether racism still exists or not.’ Those warnings echo Martin Luther King, Jr.’s earlier admonition, ‘Lukewarm acceptance is much more bewildering than outright rejection.’ In his 2003 book Nigger, Gate’s African-American Harvard colleague Randall Kennedy warns against a ‘vocabulary of indirection’ fostering a milieu in which ‘the damaging but polite polemic is protected, while the rude but impotent epithet is not.’ That observation chimes with the veteran African-American civil rights attorney Theodore Shaw’s confirmation that non-repression of hate speech facilitates the gathering of evidence for the enforcement of minorities’ rights. Martin Imbleau, albeit defending French penalties for Holocaust denial, concedes that linguistic manipulations lead to mainstreamed hate speech. But he fails to ask the crucial question – whether those manipulations emerge precisely from the need to avoid falling afoul of the French bans. Imbleau rightly counts ‘taboos’ around Nazism among the stimuli that spur Holocaust deniers. Yet he fails to explain how so strongly exalting and entrenching that taboo – augmenting our response from moral outrage to a legal penalty – can diminish such an incentive. ‘Scandal’ following high-profile prosecutions, as Adriano Prosperi observes with respect to Holocaust denial in Italy, ‘is the universal path to success’. For Strossen, ‘censored speech becomes more appealing and persuasive to many listeners merely by virtue of the censorship’. It is Imbleau’s own chain of causation, then, which identifies bans as sources rather than remedies for intolerance. He condemns the right-wing extremist Jean-Marie LePen’s self-styled image as a free speech martyr. Yet he fails to notice that it is precisely the penalties for speech, which, over decades, placed LePen in that role. French bans spurred him to promote his narrative as the heroic outsider, the renegade excluded by the state from equal access to public discourse. Imbleau warns against the dangers of Holocaust denial disseminated through the mediatization of ‘star’ anti-Semites like Robert Faurisson. He fails to observe, however, that it is precisely the French ban, as with high-profile prosecutions of Holocaust deniers in Austria, Germany, and elsewhere, which have, in each case, triggered the media hype. A further qualification added by some prohibitionists is that bans should protect only the small subset of groups targeted fro their ‘immutable characteristics’ such as race, over which one has little control, but not such as religion, which, involving ‘ideas’ (a more Western view of religion) as well as free choices, must be open to criticism. Muslims in the West, however, often form ethnic minorities. As a casual glance through the tabloids quickly reveals, stabs at Islam become ways of waging racism without reference to race even if grosser versions may end up being punishable in some LSPDs. Once again, instead of diluting hatred, such a legal incentive tutors and invigorates it. Precisely opposite to any such view, many Muslims state that it is their faith, more than their ethnicity, that forms the more important part of their identity. Far from calming the atmosphere, that ‘narrow ban’ position sets up a discriminatory, two-tier regime. It makes groups excluded from protection, because they are not defined racially, feel less respected than groups included under it. The excluded group feels more a victim of state discrimination than the protected group. State policy then pits one group against another in an unseemly rivalry of ‘more victim than thou’. Whatever anti-discrimination policies a state may prefer, one which itself discriminates between outsider groups can scarcely claim must moral high ground. As a practical matter, some oppositionists claim that bans positively detract from non-punitive programmes against intolerance, even while appearing sympathetic to them. Bans have certainly proven easy to pass with little opposition. Mainstream political parties like to be seen as supporting gestures of tolerance, regardless of the substantive policies they otherwise pursue. Sustained and effective civic education, by contrast, requires harder work. For Strossen, ‘regulating speech’ is ‘at best a distraction from, and sometimes an obstacle to, efforts to grapple with the real, concrete problems’, such as discrimination in education or employment, or the lack of investment in poor areas. Bans, Strossen argues, focus policy-makers on ‘symbolism’ instead of ‘something real to promote actual equality.’ Throughout the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries, while Germany scored questionable successes in punishing hate speech, it tended to be highly lax in punishing violent hate crimes, often failing to distinguish them from ordinary assaults and batteries. Abstention from coercive censorship by no means debilitates a democracy’s battle against intolerance. During the Danish cartoon crisis, some prominent continental media outlets reprinted the cartoons in a defensive posture of asserting their freedoms of expression, even after violent threats or responses had appeared. Their American counterparts refrained from doing so, perhaps from their own fears of attack, yet also because they had no censorship battle to wage against the government. Several European news agencies reprinted the cartoons in the defensive posture of needing to capture still-unconquered, non-viewpoint-punitive territory within public discourse.

#### Counterspeech is especially effective- it bolsters campus-wide movements and mitigates the risk of dealing with censorship issues which sacrifices focus on the movement

**Calleros 95** [Calleros, Charles R. “Paternalism, Counterspeech, and Campus Hate-Speech Codes: A Reply to Delgado and Yun” (Professor of Law, Arizona State University). HeinOnline. Arizona State Law Journal. 1995] NB

Delgado and Yun summarize the support for the counterspeech argument by paraphrasing Nat Hentoff: "[A]ntiracism rules teach black people to depend on whites for protection, while talking back clears the air, emphasizes self-reliance, and strengthens one's self-image as an active agent inchargeofone'sowndestiny."50 DelgadoandYunalsocitetothosewho believe that counterspeech may help educate the racist speaker by addressing 51 the ignorance and fear that lies behind hostile racial stereotyping. But they reject this speech-protective argument, stating that "it is offered blandly, virtually as an article of faith" by those "in a position of power" who "rarely offer empirical proof of their claims. ,,52 The authors argue that talking back in a close confrontation could be physically dangerous, is unlikely to persuade the racist speaker to reform his views, and is impossible "when racist remarks are delivered in a cowardly fashion, by means of graffiti scrawled on a campus wall late at night or on a poster placed outside of a black student's dormitory door." 53 They also complain that "[e]ven when successful, talking back is a burden" that minority undergraduates 54 should not be forced to assume. In rejecting the counterspeech argument, however, Delgado and Yun cast the argument in its weakest possible form, creating an easy target for relatively summary dismissal. When the strategies and experiential basis for successful counterspeech are fairly stated, its value is more easily recognized. First, no responsible free speech advocate argues that a target of hate speech should directly talk back to a racist speaker in circumstances that quickly could lead to a physical altercation. If one or more hateful speakers closely confronts a member of a minority group with racial epithets or other hostile remarks in circumstances that lead the target of the speech to reasonably fear for her safety, in most circumstances she should seek assistance from campus police or other administrators before "talking back." Even staunch proponents of free speech agree that such threatening speech and conduct is subject to regulation and justifies more than a purely educative response. The same would be true of Delgado's and Yun's other examples of speech conveyed in a manner that defaces another's property or 56 When offensive or hateful speech is not threatening, damaging, or impermissibly invasive and therefore may constitute protected speech, 57 education and counterspeech often will be an appropriate response. However, proponents of free speech do not contemplate that counterspeech always, or even normally, will be in the form of an immediate exchange of views between the hateful speaker and his target. Nor do they contemplate that the target should bear the full burden of the response. Instead, effective counterspeech often takes the form of letters, discussions, or demonstrations joined in by many persons and aimed at the entire campus population or a community within it. Typically, it is designed to expose the moral bankruptcy of the hateful ideas, to demonstrate the strength of opinion and numbers of those who deplore the hateful speech, and to spur members of the campus community to take voluntary, constructive action to combat hate and to remedy its ill effects. 58 Above all, it can serve to define and underscore the community of support enjoyed by the targets of the hateful speech, faith in which may have been shaken by the hateful speech. Moreover, having triggered such a reaction with their own voices, the targets of the hateful speech may well feel a sense of empowerment to compensate for the undeniable pain of the speech. 59 One may be tempted to join Delgado and Yun in characterizing such a scenario as one "offered blandly, virtually as an article of faith" and without experiential support. 6° However, campus communities that have creatively used this approach can attest to the surprising power of counterspeech. Examples of counterspeech to hateful racist and homophobic speech at Arizona State and Stanford Universities are especially illustrative.61 In an incident that attracted national attention, the campus community at Arizona State University ("A.S.U.") constructively and constitutionally responded to a racist poster displayed on the outside of the speaker's dormitory door in February 1991. Entitled "WORK APPLICATION," it contained a number of ostensibly employment-related questions that advanced hostile and demeaning racial stereotypes of African-Americans and Mexican-Americans. Carla Washington, one of a group of African- American women who found the poster, used her own speech to persuade a resident of the offending room voluntarily to take the poster down and allow her to photocopy it. After sending a copy of the poster to the campus newspaper along with an opinion letter deploring its racist stereotypes, she demanded action from the director of her residence hall. The director organized an immediate meeting of the dormitory residents to discuss the issues. In this meeting, I explained why the poster was protected by the First Amendment, and the women who found the poster eloquently described their pain and fears. One of the women, Nichet Smith, voiced her fear that all nonminorities on campus shared the hostile stereotypes expressed in the poster. Dozens of residents expressed their support and gave assurances that they did not share the hostile stereotypes, but they conceded that even the most tolerant among them knew little about the cultures of others and would 62 benefit greatly from multicultural education.  The need for multicultural education to combat intercultural ignorance and stereotyping became the theme of a press conference and public rally organized by the student African-American Coalition leader, Rossie Turman, who opted for highly visible counterspeech despite demands from some students and staff to discipline the owner of the offending poster. The result was a series of opinion letters in the campus newspaper discussing the problem of racism, numerous workshops on race relations and free speech, and overwhelming approval in the Faculty Senate of a measure to add a course on American cultural diversity to the undergraduate breadth 63 requirement.  The four women who initially confronted the racist poster were empowered by the meeting at the dormitory residence and later received awards from the local chapter of the NAACP for their activism.64 Rossie Turman was rewarded for his leadership skills two years later by becoming the first African-American elected President of Associated Students of A.S.U.,65 a student body that numbered approximately 40,000 students, only 66 2.3 percent of them African-American. Although Delgado and Yun are quite right that the African-American students should never have been burdened with the need to respond to such hateful speech, Hentoff is correct that the responses just described helped them develop a sense of self-reliance and constructive activism. Moreover, the students' counterspeech inspired a community response that lightened the students' burden and provided them with a sense of community support and empowerment. Indeed, the students received assistance from faculty and administrators, who helped organize meetings, wrote opinion letters, spoke before the Faculty Senate, or joined the students in issuing public statements at the press conference and public rally.67 Perhaps most important, campus administrators wisely refrained from disciplining the owners of the poster, thus directing public attention to the issue of racism and ensuring broad community support in denouncing the racist poster. Many members of the campus and surrounding communities might have leapt to the racist speaker's defense had the state attempted to discipline the speaker and thus had created a First Amendment issue. Instead, they remained united with the offended students because the glare of the public spotlight remained sharply focused on the racist incident without the distraction of cries of state censorship. Although the counterspeech was not aimed primarily at influencing the hearts and minds of the residents of the offending dormitory room, its vigor in fact caught the residents by surprise. 68 It prompted at least three of them to apologize publicly and to display curiosity about a civil rights movement that they were too young to have witnessed first hand. 69 This effective use of education and counterspeech is not an isolated instance at A.S.U., but has been repeated on several occasions, albeit on smaller scales.7° One year after the counterspeech at A.S.U., Stanford University responded similarly to homophobic speech. In that case, a first-year law student sought to attract disciplinary proceedings and thus gain First Amendment martyrdom by shouting hateful homophobic statements about a dormitory staff member. The dean of students stated that the speaker was not subject to discipline under Stanford's code of conduct but called on the university community to speak out on the issue, triggering an avalanche of counterspeech. Students, staff, faculty, and administrators expressed their opinions in letters to the campus newspaper, in comments on a poster board at the law school, in a published petition signed by 400 members of the law school community disassociating the law school from the speaker's epithets, and in a letter written by several law students reporting the incident to a prospective employer of the offending student.71 The purveyor of hate speech indeed had made a point about the power of speech, just not the one he had intended. He had welcomed disciplinary sanctions as a form of empowerment, but the Stanford community was alert enough to catch his verbal hardball and throw it back with ten times the force. Thus, the argument that counterspeech is preferable to state suppression of offensive speech is stronger and more fully supported by experience than is conceded by Delgado and Yun. In both of the cases described above, the targets of hateful speech were supported by a community united against bigotry. The community avoided splitting into factions because the universities eliminated the issue of censorship by quickly announcing that the hateful speakers were protected from disciplinary retaliation. Indeed, the counterspeech against the bigotry was so powerful in each case that it underscored the need for top administrators to develop standards for, and some limitations on, their participation in such partisan speech. 72 Of course, the community action in these cases was effective and empowering precisely because a community against bigotry existed. At A.S.U. and Stanford, as at most universities, the overwhelming majority of students, faculty, and staff are persons of tolerance and good will who deplore at least the clearest forms of bigotry and are ready to speak out Of course, the community action in these cases was effective and empowering precisely because a community against bigotry existed. At A.S.U. and Stanford, as at most universities, the overwhelming majority of students, faculty, and staff are persons of tolerance and good will who deplore at least the clearest forms of bigotry and are ready to speak out against intolerance when it is isolated as an issue rather than diluted in muddied waters along with concerns of censorship. Just as the nonviolent demonstrations of Martin Luther King, Jr., depended partly for their success on the consciences of the national and international audiences monitoring the fire hoses and attack dogs on their television sets and in the print media,73 the empowerment of the targets of hateful speech rests partly in the hands of members of the campus community who sympathize with them. One can hope that the counterspeech and educational measures used with success at A.S.U. and Stanford stand a good chance of preserving an atmosphere of civility in intellectual inquiry at any campus community in which compassionate, open minds predominate. On the other hand, counterspeech by the targets of hate speech could be less empowering on a campus in which the majority of students, faculty, and staff approve of hostile epithets directed toward members of minority groups. One hopes that such campuses are exceedingly rare; although hostile racial stereotyping among college students in the United States increased during the last decade, those students who harbored significant hostilities (as contrasted with more pervasive but less openly hostile, subconscious racism) still represented a modest fraction of all students.74 Moreover, even in a pervasively hostile atmosphere, counterspeech might still be more effective than broad restrictions on speech. First, aside from the constitutional constraints of the First Amendment, such a heartless campus community would be exceedingly unlikely to adopt strong policies prohibiting hateful speech. Instead, the campus likely would maintain minimum policies necessary to avoid legal action enforcing guarantees of equal educational opportunities under the Fourteenth Amendment 75 or federal antidiscrimination statutes such as Title V176 or Title IX. 77 Second, counterspeech even from a minority of members of the campus community might be effective to gradually build support by winning converts from those straddling the fence or from broader regional or national audiences. Such counterspeech might be particularly effective if coupled with threats from diverse faculty, staff, and students to leave the university for more hospitable environments; even a campus with high levels of hostility likely would feel 78 pressures to maintain its status as a minimally integrated institution. The A.S.U. and Stanford examples illustrating the efficacy of counterspeech also lend support to the argument that "[firee speech has been minorities' best friend ...[as] a principal instrument of social reform."79 In both cases, demonstrations, opinion letters, and other forms of counterspeech dramatically defined the predominant atmosphere on each campus as one that demanded respect and freedom from bigotry for all members of the community; it is doubtful that passage of a speech-restrictive policy could have sent a similar message of consensus any more strongly. Moreover, in the A.S.U. case, the reasoned counterspeech, coupled with the decision to refrain from disciplining the hateful speaker, persuaded the Faculty Senate to pass a multicultural education proposal whose chances for passage were seriously in doubt in the previous weeks and months.8 The racist poster at A.S.U. may have been a blessing in disguise, albeit an initially painful one, because it sparked counterspeech and community action that strengthened the campus support for diversity.

#### Link Turn- Prohibitions on hate speech fail- enforcement will be blocked, create backlash, used against minorities, and doesn’t work against subtle speech

**Baker 8** C. Edwin Baker. “Hate Speech.” Penn Law, Public Law and Legal Theory Research Paper Series. March 10th, 2008.

Even more problematic, to be an effective place to intervene, adopted prohibitions must be efficacious in reducing the likelihood of serious racist evils. Most obviously, this result probably requires sufficient enforcement of the prohibitions against the relevant targets. Maybe, however, their mere adoption could help create a cultural climate where racist speech, and even more importantly, virulent racist practices, are unacceptable. The question of whether to expect effective enforcement is made more difficult because it is not clear at what stage enforcement would be meaningful in preventing the polity from devolving in an unacceptably racist direction or whether enforcement could be effective at reversing cultural directions. Active enforcement (against appropriate targets) is likely only if racist groups have not become too established. By the time Nazis were gaining power, or during the year immediately preceding the genocide in Rwanda, effective enforcement was unlikely. At the relevant time, enforcement would likely either be blocked, create a backlash against the enforcers and sympathy for the ‘suppressed’ racists, or as will be discussed below, enforced primarily against ‘unpatriotic’ or ‘racist’ speech of those most needing protection – Jews or Tutsis, for example, or against African-Americans in the United States or Algerians in France. Thus, the hope of those favoring hate speech prohibitions must be that enforcement will be meaningful and effective at a quite early stage. Pessimism about this speculative hope seems justified. First are generic doubts about the likelihood of effective legal enforcement. More important, however, is the likelihood that at this most relevant stage the speech that meaningfully contributes to developing or sustaining racism will be subtle, quotidian and, to many people, seemingly inoffensive or at least not ‘seriously’ offensive speech. This speech is likely to fly under the legal radar screen and, in any event, meaningful enforcement of prohibitions against this speech is even less likely. Thus, even given a belief that racist speech contributes significantly to virulent racism and genocidal practice, my hypothesis is that at earlier stages legal prohibitions will not cover or be effectively enforced against the most relevant speech and at later stages enforcement will not occur, will be counter-productive in creating martyrs for a racist cause, or will focus on the wrong targets.

#### Link Turn- Speech codes are arbitrary- they can be used against proper forms of speech and still chill students other speech

**Golding 2K** [Martin P. Golding, [Professor, Duke University School of Law], Free Speech on Campus, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers Inc, 2000, 17. Print.]

Besides fears that certain ideas, true and false, may be expunged from the marketplace, speech codes will also indirectly eliminate acceptable ideas from the marketplace. “The movement to control speech.., has a sinister side .... The chilling effect on those who are concerned about potential pun- ishment... will surely stifle the free and robust exchange of ideas that is so critical to the campus climate.”’ 05 Even if administrators can devise a code that prohibited only the “right amount of speech” and allows all speech nec- essary for academic debate, the mere threat of penalty will have a chilling effect.’0 6 This deterrence effect will be especially strong under codes which use the contextual method or balancing test to determine whether certain speech is sanctionable, because these codes offer only vague definitions of what is permitted and what is prohibited. Thus, under these codes students and faculty will not offer certain ideas that are unpopular or inflammatory but nonetheless permitted and encouraged, because the students and faculty members will be unsure whether they will be free of sanction for presenting those ideas.7

# 1AR- T

## AT: T- Policy

#### Counter-interpretation: the aff can defend the hypothetical realization of the resolution without specifying an exact mechanism of implementation

#### 1. Case outweighs—Policy education strengthens injustice—we shouldn’t take oppressive institutions for granted—the case is a prior question to discussions of implementation

**Young 1**

Iris Marion, “Activist Challenges to Deliberative Democracy”, Political Theory, Vol. 29, No. 5 (Oct., 2001), pp. 670-690

The deliberative democrat finds such refusal and protest action uncooper- ative and counterproductive. Surely it is better to work out the most just form of implementation of legislation than to distract lawmakers and obstruct the routines of overworked case workers. The activist replies that it is wrong to cooperate with policies and processes that presume unjust institutional con- straints. The problem is not that policy makers and citizen deliberations fail to make arguments but that their starting premises are unacceptable. It seems to me that advocates of deliberative democracy who believe that deliberative processes are the best way to conduct policies even under the conditions of structural inequality that characterize democracies today **have no satisfactory response to this criticism**. Many advocates of deliberative pro- cedures seem to find no problem with structures and institutional constraints that limit policy alternatives in actual democracies, advocating reflective political reasoning within them to counter irrational tendencies to reduce issues to sound bites and decisions to aggregate preferences. In their detailed discussion of the terms of welfare reform in Democracy and Disagreement, for example, Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson appear to accept as given that policy action to respond to the needs of poor people must come in the form of poor support rather than changes in tax policy, the relation of private and public investment, public works employment, and other more structural ways of undermining deprivation and income inequality.8 James Fishkin's innovative citizens' forum deliberating national issues in connection with the 1996 political campaign, to take another example, seemed to presume as given all the fiscal, power, and institutional constraints on policy alternatives that the U.S. Congress and mainstream press assumed. To the extent that such constraints assume existing patterns of class inequality, residential segrega- tion, and gender division of labor as given, the activist's claim is plausible that **there is little difference among the alternatives debated**, and he suggests that the responsible citizen should not consent to these assumptions but **instead agitate for deeper criticism** and change. The ongoing business of **legislation and policy implementation will assume existing institutions and their priorities** as given unless massive con- certed action works to shift priorities and goals. Most of the time, then, politics will operate under the constrained alternatives that are produced by and support structural inequalities. If the deliberative democrat tries to insert practices of deliberation into existing public policy discussions, she is forced to accept the range of alternatives that existing structural constraints allow. While two decades ago in the United States, there were few opportunities for theorists of deliberative democracy to try to influence the design and process of public discussion, today things have changed. Some public officials and private foundations have become persuaded that inclusive, reasoned exten- sive deliberation is good for democracy and wish to implement these ideals in the policy formation process. To the extent that such implementation must presuppose constrained alternatives that cannot question existing institu- tional priorities and social structures, deliberation is as **likely to reinforce injustice** as to undermine it. I think that the deliberative democrat has no adequate response to this challenge other than to accept the activist's suspicion of implementing delib- erative processes within institutions that seriously constrain policy alterna- tives in ways that, for example, make it nearly impossible for the structurally disadvantaged to propose solutions to social problems that might alter the structural positions in which they stand. Only if the theory and practice of deliberative democracy are willing to withdraw from the immediacy of the already given policy trajectory can they respond to this activist challenge. The deliberative democracy should help create inclusive deliberative settings in which basic social and economic structures can be examined; such settings for the most part **must be outside of and opposed to ongoing settings of offi-cial policy discussion**.

#### 2. No ground loss—they get every generic negative argument about speech codes except the politics DA or process CPs—those encourage stale, uneducational debates anyway

#### 3. Self-reflexivity—the 1AC Moon evidence proves we have to investigate how our own subjectivities relate to patterns of symbolization—focusing on the nitty-gritty details of implementation externalize our agency onto institutions which we can’t control—only imagining the resolution as a normative statement enables us to understand the psyche—the Schwartz evidence proves that only this psychoanalytic phenomenology can foster educational dialogue on political correctness

#### 4. Limits—spec explodes the topic because it leads to infinite affs with tons of particular solvency mechanisms—that makes being neg impossible which turns all of their fairness arguments—also kills clash which is an internal link to education

#### 5. T is censorship—the case is an impact turn to T because free speech is good and their interp is political correctness! The Zizek evidence proves they cause totalitarianism which turns fairness

#### 6. Reasonability—good is good enough—competing interps creates a race to the bottom where people nitpick on theory and win on a 1% risk of abuse—that kills substantive education

# 1AR- K

## AT: Wilderson

#### Case is a prior question—Wilderson uses psychoanalysis to understand how blackness is relegated to slave-ness in the Symbolic realm—the 1AC’s psychoanalytic account of how political correctness masks anti-blackness is the logical extension of their alternative—that justifies perm: do both

#### Perm, do both—the 1AC was a writing of future imperfect—only a future-oriented narrative can escape the epistemology of racist humanism

**Marriott 11**

David Marriott (UC Santa Cruz). “Inventions of Existence: Sylvia Wynter, Frantz Fanon, Sociogeny, and "the Damned".” CR: The New Centennial Review Volume 11, Number 3, Winter 2011

Writing in the 1950s, Fanon would not be the last critic of colonialism to notice how narratives of beings outside of time, on which racist humanism turns, are worked into every aspect of belief and being in the colony. Yet though we see nothing but the effects of domination—everywhere present in the colony, affecting everyone, everywhere, regardless of class, gender, or color—we never come close to seeing what Wynter describes as the experience of "Our reality [that] was not real to us," as though this "reality" was somehow hidden or disguised by illusions that allowed the disposition and deployment of hegemonic targets and techniques (2000, 169). She continues: "while it is we humans who ourselves produce our social orders, and are in reality its authors and its agents, we also produce, at the same time, the mechanisms of occultation which serve to keep this fact opaque to ourselves" (184). This claim comes dangerously close to saying that reality is real to us because we invest in illusion. It is all **too easy to suspect some idealism** in the assumption that reality is an occulted state beyond current illusions or certain epistemic claims. Fanon's aim is not to denounce racism as an illusion or an error: or at least not in this way, which cannot account for the tenacity of how unreality is experienced and lived. Indeed, he offers slightly different descriptions, in which the real is imaginary (and vice versa). Thus, "White civilization and European culture have forced an existential deviation on the Negro. I shall demonstrate elsewhere that what is often called the black soul is a white man's artifact" (1967, 14); here, recognition of [End Page 52] deviation may demolish certain foundations and strategies, but only at the level of artifactuality. What is the reality of illusion for Fanon? Reality emerges out of our experience of illusion, but illusion persists by means of reality, which is why this deviation from reality never appears as such, and which is also why illusions take on the sense of destiny. (I think that this is what Wynter is trying to get at in her construal of a real behind illusion, but unlike Fanon, for whom the real is always veiled or masked, Wynter presupposes that the real can somehow be known. Indeed, she defines the task of black cultural criticism as the "making conscious" of the "non-conscious" laws or codes defining "our genres of being human" [2000, 207].) It would follow that Fanon's stress on the need for an entirely other order of inventiveness, for the (impossible) reinvention of the other as such, cannot be seen as an historical opposition to colonial historiography (and thereby to l'Histoire), despite his angry denunciations of colonialism's teleological thrust; if the aim is to escape history's imprisoning, that escape **will not be achieved by epistemic critique**, but rather by contesting colonialism in a more general description of its language of time. The interminable process of interpretation to which competing histories gives rise, literally maddening to those who bring to it the demand that it issue in final truths and objective fact, is abandoned by Fanon rather than adjudicated. If history thus names a disciplinary organization of meaning and power that is total but not totalizable, total because it is not totalizable, then what is most radically the matter with history is not that there may be no way out of their referential reality (a dilemma belonging to the problematic of "irreality" in Wynter's analysis), but more aporectically, that the binarisms of us and them, white and black become meaningless and the ideological effects they ground impossible as history. If it is the destiny of blackness to become white, it is not because blacks and whites are destined to be the same in their relation to reality and illusion, but same insofar as each is, on the contrary, irremediably other, an alterity where inventiveness or creativity essentially takes on that form. And clearly the writing of that alterity has to do with a future that is **not always already contained by the past**, a future that will not (always) have been, but a writing of what I venture to call Fanon's **future imperfect**: a moment of inventiveness whose introduction necessarily never arrives and does not stop arriving, and whose destination cannot be foreseen, or anticipated, but only repeatedly traveled, and, therefore, not future at all.

**Afro-pessimism’s insistence that Black subjectivity is impossible should be rejected because it perpetuates violence**

**Watts 15**

Eric King Watts (associate professor of media and technology studies, Department of Communication, UNC Chapel Hill. B.A. and M.A. from the University of Cincinnati; Ph.D. from Northwestern University). “Critical Cosmopolitanism, Antagonism, and Social Suffering.” Quarterly Journal of Speech. February 4th, 2015. http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/00335630.2015.995433

I have been asked by more than one graduate student at more than one university how I hope to reconcile the claims of Afro-Pessimism with my insistence that **voice is a fundamental human capacity.** I maintain, more or less consistently, that voice is a public occurrence animated by the acknowledgment of the ethical and affective dimensions of speech.16 The repetition of the inquiry is energized by the fact and mode of Afro-Pessimism being taken up in debate and argument organizations, programs, and competitions. I am not going to attempt to complete this reconciliation in this space, in part because I have not quite accomplished it. But I do have to briefly sketch out the terms of the challenge in order to try to evaluate the strengths and limits of critical cosmopolitanism as an academic practice that would ask “why and how” Communication Studies might interact with the Afro-Pessimistic enclave in Black Studies. While criticizing the work of Black film theory, Frank Wilderson embarks upon an ambitious and provocative campaign meant to foster an understanding of the conditions of impossibility for Black subjectivity within the contemporary ontological paradigm. The term “Afro-Pessimism” signals the work of scholars who are “theorists of structural positionality.”17 As such, Blackness and Whiteness18 are interrogated as emerging through a conjuncture with brutal modern technologies of organization and domination, and the birth of the very idea of race. Put simply, it took the modern invention of slavery and colonialism to bring about the racial ideologies that make Blackness and Whiteness intelligible. The Slave/Black, then, should not be considered exploited labor or simply oppressed. “Rather, the gratuitous violence of the Black's first ontological instance, the Middle Passage, ‘wiped out [his or her] metaphysics … his or her customs and sources on which they are based.’”19 The Black occupies a coordinate that marks a fundamental structural antagonism with the West, with Whiteness and, indeed, with the Human. It is quite easy to see why the term “Pessimism” is apt. The Black names the condition of state violence, a flesh-object brought into the world for “accumulation and fungibility.”20 The Black is essential to the production of Western subjectivity and to notions of what it means to be human. “In short, White (Human) capacity, in advance of the event of discrimination or oppression, is parasitic on Black incapacity: Without the Negro, capacity itself is incoherent, uncertain at best.” Not only is the Black incapacitated as a structural determinate, the Black is “a structural position of noncommunicability.”21 But there is a form of communication here nevertheless because the Black paradoxically signifies the “outside” that allows for the articulation of “anti-Black solidarity.”22 There is theoretical and historical support for such an analysis. For example, the early twentieth-century Americanization projects used Blackness as an exclusionary trope meant to help spur non-White immigrants from Europe and Asia toward Whiteness.23 **And here is where the term “Pessimism” seems inadequate**. As a structurally overdetermined body-image in the Western imaginary and symbolic field, Blackness registers near-nothingness: In perceiving Black folk as being alive, or at least having the potential to live in the world, the same potential that any subaltern might have, the politics of Black film theorists' aesthetic methodology and desire disavowed the fact that “[Black folk] are always already dead wherever you find them.”24 Given this dire diagnosis, why and how might we interact with Afro-Pessimism? Speaking from the point of view of a Black rhetorical scholar (and a scholar of Blackness), the answer to why is virtually self-evident: **thinking through Blackness as a condition of possibility for rhetorical action and social justice** is a life-long pursuit that, given the tragic killing of Michael Brown in Ferguson, Missouri in August 2014, feels especially burning.25 Given the affective intensity of the charge of Black noncommunicability, a **failure to meaningfully interact would engender a different kind of “violence”**; in this case a structural injunction sponsored by a lingering and recurring anxiety regarding the authority of Communication Studies.

#### Social death framing is monolithic—their method can never describe the lived experiences of slaves

**Brown 9**

Vincent Brown (Charles Warren Professor of History, Professor of African and African-American Studies, and Director of the History Design Studio at Harvard University). “Social Death and Political Life in the Study of Slavery.” The American Historical Review (2009) 114 (5): 1231-1249. <http://ahr.oxfordjournals.org/content/114/5/1231.full.pdf+html>

Slavery and Social Death was widely reviewed and lavishly praised for its erudition and conceptual rigor. As a result of its success, social death has become a handy general definition of slavery, for many historians and non-historians alike. But it is often forgotten that the concept of social death is a distillation from Patterson’s breathtaking survey—a theoretical abstraction that is meant not to describe the lived experiences of the enslaved so much as to reduce them to a least common denominator that could reveal the essence of slavery in an ideal-type slave, shorn of meaningful heritage.6 As a concept, it is what Frederick Cooper has called an “agentless abstraction” that provides a neat cultural logic but ultimately does little to illuminate the social and political experience of enslavement and the struggles that produce historic transformations.7 Indeed, it is difficult to use such a distillation to explain the actual behavior of slaves, and yet in much of the scholarship that followed in the wake of Slavery and Social Death, Patterson’s abstract distillates have been used to explain the existential condition of the enslaved. Having emerged from the discipline of sociology, “social death” fit comfortably within a scholarly tradition that had generally been more alert to deviations in patterns of black life from prevailing social norms than to the worldviews, strategies, and social tactics of people in black communities. Together with Patterson’s work on the distortions wrought by slavery on black families, “social death” reflected sociology’s abiding concern with “social pathology”; the “pathological condition” of twentieth-century black life could be seen as an outcome of the damage that black people had suffered during slavery. University of Chicago professor Robert Park, the grand-pe`re of the social pathologists, set the terms in 1919: “the Negro, when he landed in the United States, left behind almost everything but his dark complexion and his tropical temperament.”8 Patterson’s distillation also conformed to the nomothetic imperative of social science, which has traditionally aimed to discover universal laws of operation that would be true regardless of time and place, making the synchronic study of social phenomena more tempting than more descriptive studies of historical transformation. Slavery and Social Death took shape during a period when largely synchronic studies of antebellum slavery in the United States dominated the scholarship on human bondage, and Patterson’s expansive view was meant to situate U.S. slavery in a broad context rather than to discuss changes as the institution developed through time. Thus one might see “social death” as an obsolete product of its time and tradition, an academic artifact with limited purchase for contemporary scholarship, were it not for the concept’s reemergence in some important new studies of slavery.9

**Prefer focus on lived experience—structural antagonisms are not static**

**Watts 15**

Eric King Watts (associate professor of media and technology studies, Department of Communication, UNC Chapel Hill. B.A. and M.A. from the University of Cincinnati; Ph.D. from Northwestern University). “Critical Cosmopolitanism, Antagonism, and Social Suffering.” Quarterly Journal of Speech. February 4th, 2015. http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/00335630.2015.995433

And so how might we interact? If I take up the orientation of critical cosmopolitanism, I need to recognize immediately that my efforts can be dismissed by the Afro-Pessimist as colonial; that is, as a reiteration of the sort of practices that presume that one's epistemologies can translate other's bodies of knowledge into comprehensible and useful concepts and constructs. And yet, we must begin where we are, not where we hope to be. Hence, I want to make two modest and one not-so-modest suggestions for how Communication Studies in general and Rhetorical Studies in particular might interact: first, Wilderson calls for “a new language of abstraction” to elaborate “Blackness's grammar of suffering.”26 But in my reading, Afro-Pessimism is already too reliant on a language of abstraction. Lois McNay, in The Misguided Search for the Political, recently contends that theories of political power are overwrought owing to a social weightlessness brought about through high abstraction. She recommends the reinvigoration of the concept of “social suffering”—not as an entrenched category of victimage but, rather, **as the habitus of lived experience** that must be articulated to analyses of structural positionality.27 Second, I agree with McNay (who says nothing about Afro-Pessimism, by the way) that **structural antagonisms are not static, but are movable and moving configurations**. The Afro-Pessimist in Wilderson's account must agree that when a non-Black person is thrust toward the horrible condition approximating (but not identical to) the Black's structural position, **that adjustment can rightfully be called a “Blackening.”** As a happening—and not an event that has simply always already happened—this racialized procedure makes itself felt and knowable in the dense social fabric of the everyday. If the Black is in a structural position that delimits the impossibility of capacity, might we enjoin an analysis of the vocabulary of that impossibility itself? And since a “Blackening” receives intelligibility from the structural position of the Black, might we gain some productive understanding from a scrutiny of key discursive and material forms of “Blackening”? Was not Michael Brown “Blackened” in and through (and not only a priori to) his bodily encounter with state violence? Given my ongoing scholarly interest in the Zombie, I am willing to concede that an Afro-Pessimist might claim that Brown was, at the moment he was shot to death, “the dead but sentient thing, the Black” struggling “to articulate in a world of living subjects.”28 This concession functions as an assertion: the Zombie is not wholly outside Western intelligibility; it haunts the nether regions between Human and Black. Its undead existence is material and social, and supplies some vital resources for inventing a new language—a grammar of (Black) suffering. Perhaps “there is no way to Africa through the Black,”29 but maybe there is a route through the Zombie. I have argued for such a project using the terminology of reanimating Zombie voices.30 Lastly, we might think of this gloomy predicament as a tenuous point of contact with Afro-Pessimism. Wilson's intellectual history provides the basis for such a conception. Communication Studies has been (and continues to anguish over the extent that it still is) in the structural position of inferior and alienated. There should be no shame in admitting that the discipline, in relation to both the Social Sciences and the Humanities, has been and is subject to being “Blackened.” Indeed, its originary moment, as I alluded to above, meant the rejection of a set of nationalistic proprietary politics that treated Speech teachers like disposable labor. By any reasonable measure, that structural positioning—despite the fact that the people involved were White—was a racialization, a “Blackening.” Let's be perfectly clear: there is no identification being made here with the fundamental antagonism associated with the Black. However, this racialized politics (among other political registers) might provide a new critical vocabulary for Communication scholars if we do the painful work of coming to grips with the discursive and material practices of “Blackening.” There are structures of different scales. Academic structural dynamics are not dissociated from the identity ideologies implicated in nationalism and cosmopolitanism, citizenship and exile, privilege and destitution, Whiteness and Blackness. Indeed, Wilderson's critique is launched from and resides within those very same structural dynamics. It seems to me then that, at the very least, our shared social suffering with Afro-Pessimism—although of vastly different magnitudes and qualities—should be asserted as a mode of **transnational fidelity.**